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Name: Struggle against Agentura: Protocols of Interrogation of the OUN SB in Ternopil Region 1946-1948. Book 2
Volume: 44
Editor in Chief: P.J. Potichnyj
Editor(s): P.J. Potichnyj
Sponsors: Andrii Melnik
Publication Year: 2006
ISBN (Canada): 0-920092-91-8
ISBN (Ukraine): 966-96340-8-3
Pages Count: 1291

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Description

The Struggle against the Agentura

The documents in this volume are from an UPA archive that for more than fifty years lay buried in the ground in the yard at the home of Safron Kutnyi, a resident of the village of Ozerna in Zboriv raion, Ternopil’ oblast. Kutnyi lived to see the opening of the archive but died shortly afterwards.

The can containing the documents was dug up on 11 May 2004, and in September of that year these materials were transferred to the State Archive of Ternopil’ Oblast (DATO), where they comprise Fond No. R-3472. Before they were transferred, they were photocopied by Mykola Kutnyi, who then sent them to the archive “Litopys UPA” (Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army) at the University of Toronto in Canada, where they are stored in The Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine, Box 183.[1] The documents published in the book come from this collection owing to the fact that the DATO administration failed to pass a proposal by the Litopys UPA publishing house to publish these materials jointly, but in full and without superfluous editorial interference. DATO’s counterproposal that all names and surnames of individuals mentioned in these documents be listed in the form of initials was rebuffed by the publishing committee of Litopys UPA, which categorically rejects any form of censorship in the publication of historical documents.[2]

This book contains materials pertaining to the activity of the OUN’s Security Service (SB) in Ternopil’ oblast. These are reports of confessions, interrogations of both civilians and members of the Ukrainian underground, suspected of collaborating with the Soviet special services (organs of the militia, state security, etc.) as well as exposed agents, secret informers, and finally, minutes of meetings of the Territorial Organizational Court of the OUN (Terenovyi Orhanizatsiinyi Sud-TOS) and reports on the deaths of underground members.

This is the first time that it has been possible to uncover such a large body of materials pertaining to the Ukrainian underground’s struggle against the Soviet agentura in one particular western Ukrainian oblast. Similar materials from other territories consist of only one or two documents.[3]

This part of the archive numbers over 1,300 typewritten pages. In the Addenda we have also provided a List of Official Reports for 1947-1948, three reports of the TOS, two reports on the deaths of various underground activists, a letter sent to the Far East, and a report describing one event. In view of the fascinating contents of these materials, we have also included two interrogation reports that are not part of the Ozerna archive. One of them (a report on the interrogation of Mykhailo Halii) originates from Bil’shivtsi raion in Stanyslaviv oblast, while the second (a report on the interrogation of Dovhyi) is from the Rohatyn area in Stanyslaviv oblast. The report on Lypovyi-Baksha’s interrogation as well as the report on Dovhyi come from the private archive of Ternopil’ resident Petro Kasinchuk, to whom we are greatly indebted. However, it appears that both these documents as well the materials from the Ozerna archive are marked by the number R31, which, as Petro A. Duzhyi explains, indicate cases that have a bearing on the struggle against the agentura.[4] These two documents were not included in the hiding place in Ozerna. A document on the interrogation of Lypovyi-Baksha by the Soviet security organs, which we have included in the book for the purpose of comparison with the SB’s interrogation report, was discovered in the fonds of the State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (DASBU).[5] Much interesting material is found in a report on the interrogation of members of “Proboiem.” Although the status and existence of this organization have not been ascertained to the present day, one should not discard the possibility that it was a fictitious group whose goal was to penetrate the Ukrainian underground. Furthermore, as other materials clearly indicate, the Soviet special services had a rather well developed plan for their struggle against the underground, which included false flag SB fighting groups and movable hideouts.

The importance of these materials on the Security Service is multifaceted. They are helpful for studying the organization, scope, and actions of this underground structure at the very least within the limits of one oblast in the years 1946-1948, when the pressure exerted by Soviet state security institutions on the Ukrainian underground was very intense. What is remarkable is that despite this, the clandestine intelligence service and counterintelligence continued to work quite effectively and, one might add, even professionally.[6] This would indicate that during that time the SB in the Ternopil’ region had a certain infrastructure (hideouts, equipment, and premises for conducting its work) as well as appropriate personnel consisting of intelligence agents and investigators. Interrogations were not only recorded but also typewritten in at least two copies, and later (in 1950) transferred to reliable hiding places in the ground, where they were fated to remain for fifty-four years. The language of the texts is characterized by many specific features that provide grounds to assume that the texts of reports were sent to a certain place, where they were probably edited and retyped by individuals with a Soviet education.

Very little has been written about the history of the SB OUN, and thestock phrases of the past are clearly evident in the few available works.[7]

The goal of this introduction is not to write the history of this important structure. It should be recalled, however, that the 1940 split in the OUN in Krakow and the creation of the revolutionary OUN under the leadership of Stepan Bandera should be regarded as the beginning of a more professional SB. To a certain degree it was preceded by the purely military OUN counterintelligence section headed by Colonel Ievhen Konovalets, and by the SB of 1939 under the leadership of Bohdan Rybchuk. From the very beginning the head of the SB was Mykola Lebed’, and his deputy was Mykola Arsenych (“Arsen,” “Hryhor,” “Berezovs’kyi,” “Mykhailo”) who later headed the SB until his death in 1947. According to Mudryk-Mechnyk, the tasks and goals of the SB were to struggle for a healthy morale within the OUN, counteract the intelligence-subversive activity of enemy special services and their agenturas, carry out certain functions of court authorities “in the struggle against wreckers and elements hostile to the Ukrainian nation and the Organization, to ensure the personal security of OUN members and the protection of its property, and create our own positions in milieus that are foreign and hostile to us with the goals of intelligence, subversion, and provocation.” The Instructions of the Revolutionary Leadership of the OUN of May 1941 (“The Struggle and Activity of the OUN during the War”) state that the Security Service is the “second important state sector that the OUN must master as much as possible. The Security Service has the executive power to destroy by state means elements hostile to Ukraine, which will appear in a territory as wreckers, as well as the ability to control all of life.”[8] The document also states that the “Responsible Leader (Referent) of the Security Service ensures the appropriate safeguarding of organizational work and of its members, collecting information about hostile forces that act to the detriment of the OUN, carries out their liquidation, conducts internal intelligence work, etc.”[9] The scholars O. I. Lysenko and I. K. Patryliak are correct in emphasizing that already by 1941 the OUN “had quite skillfully adopted the experience of instituting control and mastering a situation from its more skilled colleagues-opponents in the NKVD organs,” but also from the Germans.[10]

These tasks of the SB were in force until the end of its existence; the only thing that changed was the organizational structure, although in time, especially in the Soviet situation, the importance of this organization notably increased in comparison with other underground structures.[11]

The organizational structure of the SB fully corresponded to the territorial structure of the OUN, which on the eve of the German-Soviet war consisted of krais, oblasts, okruhas, raions, and stanytsias.[12] In the years 1946-1948 the time frame corresponding to the materials in this volume, the structure of the SB consisted of krai, okruha-nadraion, and raion sections, and kushch and stanytsia informants. Each section was supposed to have a responsible leader, investigators, members of fighting groups, and archive keepers. In addition, nearly every section was supposed to have intelligence, counterintelligence, police, and information divisions.[13] In reality, owing to the lack of personnel, this was not always achievable. The jurisdiction of various levels of responsible leaders also changed frequently, as evidenced by various instructions issued by SB leaders.[14]

Some departures from the organizational structure, as indicated above, were dependent on the given territorial division of the OUN.[15] As the instruction indicates, from the very beginning the most trustworthy cadres were recruited to the ranks of the SB. Very often fighting groups were enlarged not only by OUN members but also individuals from the UPA, who had distinguished themselves by their discipline, level of idealism, knowledge, and bravery. After these people were incorporated into the structure of the SB, they were often retrained and then brought in as members of the OUN.

Much attention was devoted to training SB personnel of all levels.[16] In addition to general topics, special disciplines were also studied, such as the tasks of the SB, the SB’s practical activity with informants and double agents, liaison, police work, the Soviet agentura, intelligence and counterintelligence, and conspiracy.[17] Numerous instructions and orders constantly emphasized the need to purge SB personnel of hostile elements.[18] In addition, the underground leaders always stressed the need to educate the population in the struggle against the agentura.[19] The materials in this volume indicate that the knowledge and training of SB operatives were relatively high.

Below is the organizational scheme of the SB from the Main Leadership to nadraion, and from raion to the stanytsia.

As mentioned above, the responsible leader of the SB in the OUN Leadership from March 1941 until his death on 23 January 1947 was M. Arsenych. He demanded the complete subordination of all SB structures to the main responsible leader and their independence from territorial leaders on all rungs. With the second arrival of Soviet power in 1944 and the intensification of the agentura, the SB became even more independent.[20] This often led to various conflicts within underground structures and sparked the need for constant supervision of the SB’s work. An instruction dated June 1947 in Part VIII (“Instructions concerning Work in the SB”) emphasizes that “in addition to work superiors, all leaders of organizational units on all rungs must be responsible for placing the work of the SB on an appropriately high level.”[21] Excessive interference from organizational superiors, as well as a frequently careless attitude to the work of the SB, was considered harmful. However, “often certain SB staffers become ‘so independent’ in their work that they are creating an end in itself out of their professional domain and stop taking an interest in the integrity of the life of the Organization. There are also those who, as a result of the particularly important nature of the SB’s work and its broad jurisdictions, become conceited and cultivate a feeling of morbid superiority over all personnel in other branches of the Organization.”[22] In order to raise the defense capability of the entire organization, the following measures were thus proposed:

1. “That in addition to responsible leaders (referenty), their organizational superiors also be responsible for the work of the SB;

2. That organizational superiors consider responsible leaders of the SB their closest coworkers on an equal level with other members of the leadership of a given organizational unit, involve them in all matters of the subordinated organizational unit and jointly resolve all the most important issues of the territory;

3. That the responsible leaders of the SB inform their superiors about all agentura matters in the territory and Bolshevik methods of struggle against the Organization. (It is emphasized that information about Bolshevik police organs, their agents, and work methods are secret and cannot be publicized. Permission to use part of the SB’s information in propaganda publications is possible only with the agreement of the higher superiors in the SB (Krai, Okruha));

4. The most reliable and, as far as possible, the most intellectually developed personnel must always be designated for work in SB sections; 5. All staff members of the SB must constantly raise their ideological-political level for which both work and organizational Superiors are responsible.

6. Work superiors are responsible for the professional training and development of SB personnel and for their professional work (content, work methods, etc.);

7. All members of the Organization, particularly leading ones, must absolutely complete basic training (theoretical-practical) in the work of the SB. Responsible leaders of the SB and organizational superiors are responsible for conducting the training;

8. In order to enhance the qualifications of SB personnel and leading members of the Organization it is advisable to familiarize them with reports of completed cases in which the enemy’s work methods are presented in detail. This type of report can be used only with the permission of higher superiors;

9. Organizational superiors together with responsible leaders of the SB should constantly devise new methods of conspiratorial activity (the conduct of members, distribution of literature, meetings, contacts, approaching legals, etc.);

10. The entire Organization is waging a struggle against known Bolshevik lackeys and activists (the party, administration, Komsomol, collective farms, etc.). The SB conducts all matters of an agentura nature, or in the case of an already unmasked agentura, other members of the Organization under the direction of responsible leaders of the SB.

[Organizational] superiors should institute personnel changes in SB sections in coordination with the appropriate SB superiors. Professionally qualified SB personnel cannot be freely transferred to other spheres of work. In exceptional, crucial, cases, when a leading post of an organizational unit must be filled, responsible leaders of the SB may be appointed as acting leaders.” In order to prevent the SB’s actions from being characterized “by disorder and unrestraint,” the leadership of the SB issued “Circular No. 1 of 7 October 1945,” requiring that its lower cells “uphold the investigation procedure and avoid unsubstantiated repressions,” and that “SB investigators should…draft reports of interrogations of detainees and arrested individuals in a fitting manner in accordance with the proposed model.”[23] As we can see from the reports of hearings, SB investigators tried to follow these instructions.

Most of the files are marked by an appropriate cardinal number that also includes the year, which makes it possible to ascertain the approximate number of cases examined by investigators every year. In addition, every file had a date, name and surname of the individual figuring in the case, his connection with the agentura, his pseudonym, and the investigator’s pseudonym (in most cases a numerical one). These facts lead one to conclude that SB investigators were attached to a certain raion. Obviously, in the absence of complete data it is not possible to determine whether pseudonyms were always affixed to certain individuals or whether a given investigator had several pseudonyms. For the purpose of comparison the table below lists pseudonyms of investigators and their distribution in the years 1946-1948 within the raion borders of 1973.[24] This chart is incomplete and is based only on the materials included in this book. Therefore, it should be regarded only as a hypothesis.

Pseudonyms of SB Investigators*

Raion194619471948
Berezhany area – Pidhaitsi (now a separate raion) ? ?, Vsevolod, Ihor, Stiopa, Misiats’, Omel’ko, Ruchai, Rukh, Sosna, Stiopa, 25/4, 25/5, 37/3, 212 ?, Vasyl’, Romko, 2/2, 19/1, 28/2, 212
Borshchiv area – Skala Podil’s’ka Nechai, Prometei, 0/7, 40/7 0/04, 40/5, 40/7 02, 10/1, 40/7
Buchach area – Zolotyi Potik Zakhar, Klym, Lystok, 20/3, 25/a, 35/a Zakhar, 20/3
Husiatyn area – Tovste ?, Gonta, 40/3, 40/8?
Zalishchyky area Gonta
Zbarazh area – Vyshnivets 55 Voron, Leonid, 747 4/48, 38/23, 77/a, 83, 86, 152
Zboriv area ?, 757 757
Kozova area – Kozliv ?, 25/3, 58/a, 737 46/4, 737
Kremenets’ area – Pochaiv 38 Voron, 38
Lanivtsi area 60 60
Monastyrys’ka area – Koropets’ ?, Shakh ?
Pidvolochys’k area – Nove Selo – Skalat 100 15, 16, 60, D ?, 55
Terebovlia area – Budaniv – Zolotnyky – Mykulyntsi ? ?, 20/1, 25/6, 37/3, 37/8?, 888 ?, Okh, Kryha, 37/3, 38/23, 678, 808?, (888?)
Ternopil’ (now a separate raion) 7 51/a, 678
Chortkiv area – Bilobozhnytsia – Probizhna ?, Sian, 20/3, 60/2 ?, 20/3 ?
Shums’k area – Velyki Dederkaly ?, Rudenko ?, Iar, 44, 97, 98 506, 507

* The raion name from 1973 onwards is indicated in bold. The question mark denotes unidentified investigators.

The largest number of SB cases—nearly one-quarter—comes from the Berezhany area. The probable reason for this is that organizational structures of the underground—the Krai Leadership, Supreme Headquarters of the UPA, and the SB and Propaganda sections—were located here. Until his death in January 1947 as a result of treachery, M. Arsenych, the Responsible Leader of the SB of the OUN Leadership, operated here.[25]

Methods for conducting hearings varied, but often, as interrogation reports clearly indicate, physical methods were used to obtain information. One can assume that in most cases, if not all, the most harmful Soviet agents were exposed and destroyed. Some reports speak very plainly about this, but most do not say anything. It is quite possible that some agents recruited by Soviet security among the rural population were of very low caliber and effectiveness, and therefore were released after being questioned and threatened. However, there is a dearth of reliable information about this, too. Neither is any information provided about the re-recruitment of exposed Soviet agents by the underground’s intelligence service. There were probably such attempts, as Petro A. Duzhyi’s confession clearly indicates.[26]

The materials collected in this volume provide extremely interesting information on the anti-underground measures undertaken by the Soviet organs of internal affairs and state security. Interrogations of suspected individuals by SB investigators clearly point to various methods of recruitment, control, and the operational use of agents in the struggle against the Ukrainian underground.

Despite the variety of reports from “Red partisans,” after its return to Ukraine the Soviet government felt the lack of detailed information on the strength, structure, and organization of the Ukrainian liberation movement. Military intelligence conducted during the struggle against the UPA or the armed OUN underground was obviously inadequate. Therefore, in all instructions from the center, as well as in the speeches of Soviet leaders, like Nikita Khrushchev, emphasis was laid on the priorities of building up the agentura with the goal of penetrating the liberation movement.[27] Oblast and raion heads of the NKVD/MVD-NKGB/MGB as well as operatives of the Department for Struggle against Banditry (OBB) were assigned to this work. (Special groups were subordinated to the Main Directorate for Struggle against Banditry (GUBB), a division of the NKVD. Special groups were usually commanded by three people, including operatives from the NKVD and SMERSH, holding a rank no lower than second lieutenant.[28] The names of OBB operatives also appear in various reports stored in the Archive of the Interior Troops of the Ukrainian District. The main task of GUBB agents was infiltration, sabotage, and the liquidation of the anti-Soviet opposition.) It should be noted that the Soviet special services enjoyed noteworthy successes as a result of these measures.[29] This is also confirmed by the materials included in this book.

In their work the personnel of the organs used well known recruitment methods: striking up an acquaintance; making contact with individual underground members, often in the form of messengers; intensive actions, such as blackmail; bribery; persuasion; publicizing treachery; creating or exploiting problems in the workplace; gossip, etc. In the majority of cases, initial contact with people was made through a previous arrest and their usually speedy release that involved the signing of a declaration of cooperation, or without one. Very often short-term arrests or so-called summons for a “talk” with relatives of underground members were carried out in order to implicate them as secret collaborators. This in turn created serious difficulties in the work of the underground’s counterintelligence structures. The Supreme Commander of the UPA and the Head of the Bureau of the OUN Leadership, General Roman Shukhevych-”Taras Chuprynka,” himself warned about this danger. He insisted that the “liberation struggle is possible only if there is complete trust.”[30] It was not always possible fully to control this situation, as the Volyn events clearly attest.[31] For the sake of balance, one should also emphasize the fact that the Soviet side applied mass terror on a huge scale against the population, and its special groups carried out numerous atrocities in villages, including desecrating corpses of killed underground members.

In the second phase, where the collection or transmission of information was concerned, various methods were also used. Among the various motivations that were applied, we also see financial rewards (very often inadequate), fear for oneself or one’s family, very often sparked by brutal physical or psychological actions (vicious beating, rape, even castration),[32] the application of intense pain or painful action, eliciting and exploiting sexual feelings, especially in relation to women,[33] eliciting feelings of unconcern, playing on national and religious feelings, a sense of civic or moral duty, speculating on ideal perceptions of oneself, feelings of elitism, etc. Often inter-ethnic conflicts were successfully exploited, e.g., Polish-Ukrainian conflicts. To a certain extent the deportation of the Poles from western Ukraine weakened agentura operations, which had to be developed from scratch to replace the deportees.

On the whole, the recruitment of an agentura was accompanied by excesses. To a certain degree the speed with which Soviet functionaries had to act increased the tendency to falsifying operational reports. This situation also offered an opportunity for the underground to infiltrate Soviet power structures.[34] Nearly half of all agentura workers were recruited in the first half of 1945.[35] By September 1946, 2,968 secret collaborators, or 9 percent of the 33,740 peasants of Galicia, had become members of extermination battalions.[36] True, in this period the work was not yet very successful, as the 6 April 1946 resolution of the Politburo of the CC CP(b)U indicates.[37]

However, the Soviet power structures also enjoyed certain successes. It is noteworthy that certain individuals, regardless of the method used to recruit them, generally carried out their role of intelligence agents against the underground in a conscientious fashion and, one may add, quite effectively. As the case of S. Duleba demonstrates, the death of Mykola Arsenych, the Responsible Leader of the SB in the Main OUN Leadership, was the result of agentura measures. The actions of these agents not only threatened the liberation movement but also implicated hundreds of people, who became targets of further persecution by the Soviet government as “abettors of bandits,” etc. Thus, state terror against citizens constantly escalated and was accompanied by numerous arrests, deportations to Siberia, etc., as well as by a rise in corruption and looting by the organs of internal affairs and state security. As of November 1948, nearly one year before Khrushchev’s transfer to Moscow, the change in Soviet tactics against the underground, and especially the consolidation of both agentura and political measures of the Soviet government (a survey of illegal methods of struggle against the population was launched in 1948), the Soviet authorities could boast of relatively great progress in the struggle against the Ukrainian underground.

As another table featured in the latter section of the book shows, MVD and MGB functionaries were also assigned to work in a clearly designated territory of a raion or village.[38] Obviously, this was determined by the need to know the lay of the land and the people. The information also includes the names of individuals suspected of agentura work, as well as the date of each case. Many of the functionaries listed here can be identified in the archives of the Interior Troops of the Ukrainian District.[39]

Nevertheless, it should be noted that in many cases the SB was able to neutralize Soviet agentura penetration of the Ukrainian underground, which was the subject of numerous reports to the CC CP(b)U.[40]

* * *

Volumes 43 and 44 cover the same subject matter. The large amount of material required that it be divided into two books. Volume 43, Book 1, covers materials from: Berezhany, Bilobozhnytsia, Borshchiv, Budaniv, Buchach, Velyki Birky, Velykyi Hlybochok, Velyki Dederkaly, Vyshnivets’, Zalishchyky, Zalozhtsi, Zabarazh, and Zboriv. Volume 44, Book 2, covers raiony: Zolotyi Potik, Zolotnyky, Kozova, Kozliv, Koropets’, Kremenets’, Lanivtsi, Mykulyntsi, Nove Selo, Pidvolochys’k, Pidhaitsi, Pochaiv, Probizhna, Skala Podil’s’ka, Skalat, Terebovlia, Tovste, Chortkiv, Shums’k, and the Rohatyn raion of Stanyslav oblast’. Here are also found Protocols of TOS, Protocols of Death, Letter of underground workers to Far East, Protocol of One Event, the list of MVD and MGB functionaries and the list of SB interrogators. Introduction to both books is located in vol. 43.

Special thanks for his assistance in the preparation of this volume are owed to Dr. Ihor Homziak, who not only organized the computer typesetting of the material but also oversaw the proofreading, layout, and preparation of the name and geographic indexes.

Peter J. Potichnyj


[1] The Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine, hereafter, PJP Collection.
[2] The archival administration’s position on this matter is clearly explained in an article by H. Papakin: “Ozernians’kyi arkhiv-Novi dzherela do istoriii ukrains’koho rukhu oporu,” Arkhivy Ukrainy, nos. 1-3 (256), January-June 2005, pp. 513-34. The accessibility to SB materials in the SBU archivefor scholars is still quite limited although some materials about the organization and activities of this structure have been published. See: Valerii Iefymenko,”Kadrovyi sklad spetsial’noho pidrozdilu OUN(B): Sproba analizu”,,Z arkhiviv VUChK, GPU,NKVD,KGB, 1/2 (10/11), 1999, pp. 443-456; His, “ Taktyka ta metody roboty pratsivnykiv spetsial’noho pidrozdilu OUN(B)”, Ibid., pp. 504-514; His, “Orhanizatsiia diial’nosti spetspidrozdilu OUN(B) na zakhidnoukrains’kykh zemliakh pislia druhoi svitovoi viiny”, Ibid., 2 (17), 2001, pp. 502-519.
[3] All the interrogation reports date to 1946-1948 and are grouped in the following order according to the raions that existed at the time: Pidhaitsi—31 files (including one file from Bil’shivtsi raion in Stanyslaviv oblast [today: Ivano-Frankivs’k]); Zolotnyky—16 files; Berezhany—16; Borshchiv—13; Velyki Dederkaly—10; Bilobozhnytsia—9; Zolotyi Potik—9; Buchach—7; Tovste—7; Zboriv—6; Koropets’—6; Vyshnivets’—5; Kozliv—5; Kozova—5; Velyki Birky—5; Pochaiv—5; Budaniv—4; Zbarazh—4; Mykulyntsi—4; Kremenets’—3; Lanivtsi—3; Zalishchyky—2; Zalozhtsi—2; Nove Selo—2; Skala Podil’s’ka—2; Terebovlia—2; Chortkiv—2; Shums’k—2; Pidvolochys’k—1; Probizhna—1; Skalat—1; and Rohatyn (Stanyslaviv oblast)—1. Brief references to the activity of the SB in the Ternopil’ region (Podillia Krai) may also be found in the Interrogation Reports of Ia. Bilins’kyi (“Bystryi”), State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (hereafter, DASBU), file 6744, fols. 11-17 and 32-78. According to P. A. Duzhyi, the Responsible Leader of the SB for Podillia Krai was “Maksym” at this time. Interrogation Report, DASBU, fond 6, file 72362-fp, fols. 87-103.
[4] Report of the interrogation of Petro A. Duzhyi, DASBU, fond 6, file 72362-fp, fols. 87-103.
[5] See S. A. Kokin, Anotovanyi pokazhchyk dokumentiv z istorii OUN i UPA u fondakh Derzhavnoho Arkhivu SBU: Vypusk I, Anotovanyi pokazhchyk dokumentiv z fondu drukovanykh vydan’ (1944-1953) (Kyiv, 2000), pp. 37-8.
[6] Confirmation of this may also be found in various underground publications from the territory of Ternopil’ oblast, which come from the Ozerna archive, e.g.: Visti z terenu (Ternopil’shchyna), January 1947-July 1948; Vistky z Ternopil’shchyny, December 1947-October 1948; Visti z terenu (Kremianechchyna), January-November 1948; Visit z terenu (Skalatshchyna), June 1948; Visti z terenu (Pochaiv), March 1948; Visti z terenu (Berezhany), April-June 1947; Visti z terenu (Dederkaly), April 1948; Visti z terenu (Chortkivshchyna), January-March, July-August 1947; Visti z terenu (Kopychyntsi), March-April 1948; Visti z terenu (Bilobozhnytsia), January 1948; Visti z terenu (Lanivtsi), July 1947; Visti z terenu (Vyshnivets’), February-March 1948, as well as Suspil’no-politychnyi zvit (Skalatshchyna), August-December 1948; Suspil’no-politychnyi zvit (Dederkaly), March-April 1948; and Suspil’no-politychnyi zvit (Chortkivshchyna), January-March, July-September 1947. A fascinating example of what kind of information the underground had at its disposal is Kharakterystyka Zalozets’koho raionu (Informatsii z zhovtnia 1946 r.) provided by “Zhur.” This report thoroughly analyzes all the Soviet institutions in this raion, and their ethnic and party composition. The report also states that a similar situation existed in other raions of this oblast. PJP, Box No. 81.
[7] See S. Mudryk-Mechnyk, Sluzhba bezpeky Revoliutsiinoi OUN u borot’bi z NKVD-NKGB-MGB-KGB (Ternopil’, 1994); Dmytro Viedienieiev and Volodymyr Iehorov, “Mech i tryzub. Notatky do istorii Sluzhby Bezpeky Orhanizatsii Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv,” Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB, nos. 1-2 (1998). In their extremely useful book O. Ie. Lysenko and I. K. Patryliak list instructions concerning the structure of the SB of the Leadership of the Revolutionary OUN not only from May 1941 but also 1942-1946, when the underground was waging a struggle against Berlin and Moscow. O. Ie. Lysenko and I. K. Patryliak, Materialy ta dokumenty Sluzhby Bezpeky OUN(B) (Kyiv, 2003), hereafter, Lysenko and Patryliak. See also I. K. Patryliak, Viis’kova diial’nist’ OUN(B) u 1940-1942 rokakh (Kyiv, 2004), pp. 497-98, 502-03, and 519-22 (hereafter, I. K. Patryliak). Petro A. Duzhyi also mentions various instructions of the SB. See Protokol pereslukhannia, DASBU, fond 6, file 72362-fp, fols. 87-103. Another interesting publication, but one that is full of errors, is “Vlasnoruchna notatka Zbignieva Kamins’koho ‘Dona’ vid 26 liutoho 1958 r. stosovno Sluzhby Bezpeky OUN” in Poliaky i ukraintsi mizh dvoma totalitarnymy systemamy 1942-1945, pt. 1 (Warsaw-Kyiv, 2005), pp. 180-190. A very important contribution to the understanding of the conflict between the secret services of the USSR and Poland, and the SB ZCh OUN is Igor Halagida’s book Prowokacja “Zenona”: Geneza, przebieg i skutki operacji MBP o kryptonimie “C-1” przeciwko banderowskiej frakcji OUN i wywiadowi brytyjskiemu (1950-1954) (Warsaw: IPN, 2005), because it corrects the exaggerated successes of the SB as presented by Mudryk-Mechnyk.
[8] I. K. Patryliak, ibid., pp. 497-98.
[9] Ibid., pp. 502-03, 519-22.
[10] Lysenko and Patryliak, pp. 10-12.
[11] For example, in the document, Order to the Responsible Leaders of the SB (April 1945), it is clearly stated that “territorial leaders do not have the right to control the SB’s mail or reports that go upstairs,” while “raion responsible leaders (referents) of the SB report to their territorial leaders only verbally and only on matters that concern them exclusively (organizational matters and operational work).” Ibid., p. 200.
[12] I. K. Patryliak, pp. 514-15.
[13] OUN i UPA (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 2005), p. 373; A. Kentii, UPA v 1944-1945 rr. (Kyiv, 1999), p. 22.
[14] Lysenko and Patryliak, pp. 140-42, 158-60.
[15] Volyn i Polissia: UPA ta zapillia 1943-1944. Dokumenty i materialy. Litopys UPA, n.s., vol. 2 (Kyiv-Toronto, 1999), pp. 80-82, 305-08, and 419-27. See also Volyn, Polissia, Podillia: UPA ta zapillia 1944-1946. Dokumenty i materialy. Litopys UPA, n.s., vol. 8 (Kyiv-Toronto, 2006), pp. 297-363, 373-87, 617-18, 707-17, and 851-59.
[16] For example, an instruction from June 1947 requires all members of the SB to familiarize themselves with the training material “Iak poboriuvaty NKVD i NKGB ta t.zv. kontrrevoliutsiiu v SSSR.” All leading cadres, up to the raion level inclusively, were supposed to acquaint themselves with “Agentura NKGB v dii,” and up to the nadraion level, with “Do borot’by z agenturoiu” in PJP Collection, Box 81. See also various instructions in Lysenko and Patryliak.
[17] Lysenko and Patryliak, pp. 161-71, 178-82, and 183-98.
[18] Ibid., pp. 175-77 and 199-201.
[19] A typical example of such general instructions that appeared in various territories is “Dumky do hutirky z naselenniam proty zarazy seksotstva” of 5 January 1945, the author of which was Iaroslav Starukh (“Stoiar”), the Krai Leader of Zakerzonnia. PJP Collection, vol. 11, 7 (1945), Box 81.
[20] The assumption of some researchers that the growth of the SB’s autonomy beginning in 1943 was connected to internal organizational disputes between M. Lebed’ and other members of the leadership have no documentary substantiation. See, e.g., I. Iliushyn, “Antypol’s’kyi front v boiovii dial’nosti OUN i UPA (1939-1945)”, Ukrains’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, no. 3, 2002, p. 100.
[21] Instruction, June 1947. PJP Collection, Box 81.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Materialy ta dokumenty Sluzhby bezpeky OUN(B) u 1940 rr. (Kyiv, 2003), p. 200.
[24] For more detailed information about investigators and their cases, see List of Investigators according to the Raions of Ternopil’ oblast, 1945-1948, in the latter part of the book.
[25] Peter J. Potichnyj, Arkhitektura rezystansu: Kryivky i bunkry UPA v radians’kykh dokumentakh (Toronto-L’viv, 2002), pp. 272-75. This is also confirmed by Volodymyr Serhiichuk in his Ukrains’kyi zdvyh: Podillia. 1939-1955 (Kyiv: Ukrains’ka Vydavnycha Spilka, 2005), p. 121.
[26] Report of Petro A. Duzhyi’s interrogation, DASBU, fond 6, file 72362-fp, fols. 87-103.
[27] The American scholar Jeffrey Burds has shed much light on the organization and actions of the “agentura” in his many works devoted to this topic and the Ukrainian underground. However, Burds has proved unable to withstand Soviet propaganda and thus believes that “Ukrainian-German nationalists” were groups consisting of Ukrainians and Germans and not merely a Soviet propaganda label. On the whole, however, his approach to the problem is generally objective. See Jeffrey Burds, “Agentura: Soviet Informants’ Networks & the Ukrainian Rebel Underground in Galicia, 1944-1948,” East European Politics and Societies 11, no. 1 (winter 1997): 89-130; also his “Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948,” Cahiers du Monde russe 42, nos. 2-4 (April-December 2001): 279-320; in Russian translation: “Moskal’ki”: zhenshchiny agenty i natsionalisticheskoe podpol’e na Zapadnoi Ukraine, 1944-1948" and under a changed title: “Zhenshchiny-agenty i natsionalisticheskoe podpol’e na Zapadnoi Ukraine, 1944-1948.” As numerous instructions issued by the SB indicate, agentura measures were well known to the underground. See Lysenko and Patryliak, pp. 183-98.
[28] The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the People’s Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) are two secret police institutions. In March 1946 they were renamed as ministries: MVD and MGB. Until 21 January 1947 special groups were subordinated to the State Directorate (GU) MVD/MGB for Struggle against Banditry (GUBB). Later they were transferred to MGB control until the reorganization of the police system, which took place after Stalin’s death in 1953. For a list of GUBB operatives, see the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), fond R-9478, list 1, file 527, fols. 109-17.
[29] See Khrushchev’s report of 20 December 1945 to Stalin: N. Khrushchev, “Tovarishchu Stalinu” in the Central State Archive of Civic Organizations of Ukraine, hereafter, TsDAHOU, fond 1, list 23, file 1848, fols. 397-406. Khrushchev writes: “With the goals of preserving the cadres of our agentura and for the disorientation of the bandits in their exposure of individuals connected to the NKVD and NKGB organs, we have suggested to the Heads of the UNKVD and UNKGB to broadly apply the practice of the personnel of the organs summoning a large number of local residents /up to 50 or more people, depending on the number of residents in a given populated area/ for a talk during 1-2 days, in which connection mostly kulaks, traders, and other elements that are hostile to us should be summoned. Those summoned after the talk are to be invited to collaborate with the NKVD and NKGB organs, and first and foremost those who are suspected of having links with the bandits.” Khrushchev then gives the results of such measures, indicating that this is causing confusion among the members of the underground. At the same time he notes that 1,830 extermination battalions numbering 40,310 men have been organized. See Ivan Bilas, Represyvno-karal’na systema v Ukraini, 1917-1953, (Kyiv, Lybid’-Viis’ko Ukrainy, 1994), vol. 1 p. 274. In June 1948 the MVD organs created armed groups for the protection of public order (so-called GOGP). The extermination battalions that belonged to the MGB were liquidated, and their personnel and weapons were transferred to the GOGP after being vetted. As of 1 January 1949 there were 6,437 such groups totaling 86,527 people. Ibid. pp. 367-369.
[30] Liubomyr Poliuha, “Shliakhamy spohadiv,” Roman Shukhevych: Postat’ na tli doby Voiuiuchoi Ukrainy. (Collection of papers from a conference in Ternopil’, 28-29 September 2000) (Ternopil, 2005), p. 258. See also “R. Shelest’s” Order of UPA-West “Zamok” no. 9/44 of 25 November 1944, and especially the supplement to Order no. 9/44, which contains a detailed description of the enemy’s agentura tactics.
[31] See, e.g., Protokol pereslukhannia Fedora V. Vorobtsia (“Vereshchaky”), DASBU, fond 5, file 48139, fols. 13-100.
[32] See Burds, “The Strategic Uses of Torture in Soviet Galicia, 1944-1948” [Precis]. The University of Chicago Human Rights Program, 4-7 March 1999.
[33] For an interesting study of women in the intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the GUBB and the Ukrainian underground, see Burds, “Gender and Policing.” The Russian version of this article is available on the Internet.
[34] The Soviet agentura had a huge scope. As of 1 July 1945 the NKVD had 11,214 agentura personnel: 175 residents, 1,196 agents, and 9,843 informants (osvedomiteli).
[35] Burds, “Agentura,” p. 120. See also “Zvit Ternopil’s’koho obkomu KP(b)U, Upravlinnia NKVS i NKDB URSR pro khid vykonannia postanov TsK VKP(b) i TsK KP(b)U, spriamovanykh na borot’bu z formuvanniamy UPA i pidpilliam OUN,” Litopys UPA, n.s., vol. 4 (Kyiv-Toronto, 2002), pp. 347-61.
[36] Saraev, “Spravka o sostoianii operativno-boevoi deiatel’nosti istrebitel’nykh batal’ionov zapadnykh oblastei USSR,” TsDAHOU, fond 1, list 23, file 2967, fols. 53-4.
[37] “Postanova Politbiuro TsK KP(b) ‘Pro dobir ta vykhovannia kadriv z mistsevoho naselennia v orhanakh ministerstva vnutrishnikh sprav Rivnens’koi, Stanislavs’koi I Ternopil’s’koi oblastei,’” Litopys UPA, n.s., vol. 3 (Kyiv-Toronto, 2001), pp. 231-33. See also Kruglov’s report to Khrushchev, dated 13 July 1946, TsDAHOU, fond 1, list 23, file 2966, fols. 78-9, in which he blames the heads of raion and oblast party committees for their incorrect approach to agentura work.
[38] See the List of Functionaries of the NKVD/NKGB-MVD/MGB by raion.
[39] See the PJP Collection. Some of them are also mentioned in Serhiichuk’s book Ukrains’kyi zdvyh. He is the only researcher in Ukraine who has worked in the archives of the Interior Troops.
[40] “Pro polipshennia masovo-politychnoi roboty, podal’shyi rozvytok kolhospnoho budivnytstva i likvidatsiiu zalyshkiv band ukrains’ko-nimets’kykh natsionalistiv u zakhidnykh oblastiakh URSR,” 1 June 1948, in Litopys UPA, n. s., vol. 6 (Kyiv-Toronto, 2003), p. 330. In 1948 the struggle against the Soviet regime specifically in the Ternopil’ region took very acute forms. Ibid., pp. 114-23 and 428-32.

 
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